Cultural feelings are an undertheorised area of the human experience which are recently gaining attention and which need to be understood in the context of museum visitor studies where they are largely ignored. Drawing on a long-term narrative study of global visitors to the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa), this paper unearths the conditions of meaning-making or hermeneutic foundations that facilitate the subsequent processes of meaning-making or interpretations. It argues that the engagement with a museum space starts on a sensory, emotive and embodied level. Visitors' narrations of their visit to the museum reveal that emotions and feelings are not separate stages of the museum experience but are continuously interwoven with intellectual and interpretive processes. Importantly, the empirical evidence shows that certain meanings remain on an embodied level as an 'internal understanding' and resist any verbal 'expressibility'. The conditions flow into the processes of meaning-making during cross-cultural encounters within the material museum world. Here, feelings enter into the realm of culture and thus into the experience of heritage.
Introduction
When I think of Māori for some reason I am associating the marae … it really resonated with me … When I saw it, it just brought back the feelings that I had had when I had been at the one in Maketu … I just really appreciated that this person was welcoming us into his life, his world and his family so to speak. (Claudia, Canada) As Claudia in the above quotation reveals, heritage can be seen as a Gestalt experience that enables a transformation of the Self through the engagement with the Other. Heritage, I argue, is not an inherited essence but an experienced process; a process in which our emotions and feelings are enmeshed with our thoughts. In fact, the dimensions of thinking and feeling heritage are tightly interwoven and could never be dichotomised into separate stages. While the paper develops this argument through an analysis of a small number of narratives provided by global visitors to Te Papa, I also use their narrated experiences to intervene in what appears to be a growing opposition between representational and non-representational forms of analysis. Given that, as Dewey (1934, p. 18 ) once famously said, in 'life that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges', I consider 'distinctions' such as 'narrative' and 'affect', which are often seen as mutually exclusive human phenomena, as interrelated traces which make sense only in their relations within the Self. By embedding such a theoretical synthesis in the analysis of a lived experience, or empirical reality, I argue that we gain insights into the 'more than representational' (Smith 2006b ) avoiding reductionist approaches 'against the representational' and thus drawing a complex both/and rather than a simplistic either/or picture, as Waterton (in press) equally stresses.
The long-term narrative study of global visitors to the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa), which informs this paper, shows that the engagement with a museum space begins on a sensory, emotive and embodied level. Claudia from Canada, for example, stresses that 'you really get drawn into the scene' through 'sensory experiences', a hermeneutic condition I term emotive and sensory contextualisation. Visitors' narrations reveal the ubiquitous presence of the emotive dimension throughout the experience. The ontological sense of a feeling, the feeling of being, first precedes and is then permanently intertwined with intellectual and interpretive processes. While language performs as the main cultural tool for the 'growth of meaning' (Johnson 2007) , certain meanings remain on an embodied level as 'internal understandings', as Claudia put it, and resist any attempt of formal verbalisation. In the context of Te Papa, with its strong bicultural approach to the representation of New Zealand culture and identity, this emotive trajectory carries through the visitors' own cross-cultural journeys within this material museum space, manifesting itself as cultural feelings.
Surveying Te Papa's bicultural experiment in detail is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, but it is necessary to briefly introduce and contextualise the site where this research was conducted. McCarthy (2007) shows how the remarkable encounter of Māori and Europeans unfolded throughout the colonial cultures of display in museums, ultimately leading to Māori control and ownership of Māori collections and exhibitions. Today, Te Papa is committed to developing as a bicultural organisation based on the principle of partnership enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 between the British Crown and Māori. The Treaty is widely regarded as the founding document of Aotearoa New Zealand; and after decades of negligence it has gained constitution-like status in recent years. Concrete policies and practices such as Mana Taonga and Mātauranga Māori ensure Māori participation and involvement in the museum (Hakiwai 2006 , Smith 2006a .
Background
This article is embedded within two wider analytical and argumentative developments within heritage studies. Firstly, there is an increasing interest in, and focus on, heritage as an ongoing process rather than a finished product (Smith 2006b , Macdonald 2009 , Daugbjerg and Fibiger 2011 . The associated shift in thinking facilitates the inspection of 'heritageisation' (Harvey 2001) and its continuous construction, deconstruction and reconstruction from an 'assembling perspective' (Macdonald 2009 ). Smith (2006b, p. 1) , however, highlights that heritage is still only marginally understood as an experience, as a 'process of engagement' and 'act of making meaning'. According to Smith (2006b, p. 308) , more ethnographic research is needed 'in uncovering the moments' of heritage. This article follows this call and conceives the moments and processes of heritage as an 'articulation' or 'enunciation' (Bhabha 1994) . By humanising heritage through interpretive actions, movements and performances made by cultural actors, I am able to open a hermeneutic terrain of cultural negotiation and contestation. This paves the way to cultural worldmaking, a process, which I argue, always starts with an act of interpretation (Schorch 2010) .
Secondly, there is a growing body of literature within and beyond heritage studies which calls our attention to dimensions such as 'senses', 'feelings', 'emotions', 'affect' and 'embodiment' to gain a more nuanced view of the human experience (Edwards et al. 2006 , Gregory and Witcomb 2007 , Thrift 2008 , Dudley 2009 , Witcomb 2009 , Gregg and Seigworth 2010 . While I certainly support such a vein of thought, as the title of this paper indicates, I do not think that the 'non-representational' should or could be understood as 'anti-biographical' (Thrift 2008) . Such a dualistic stance seems to be self-defeating, since, by attempting to dissolve a perceived dichotomy, here the widespread representational dominance, it tears open another rigid chasm between binary oppositions. This arguments risks committing what Dewey branded 'the philosophical fallacy' (Jackson 1998, p. 3) by elevating intellectual inventions such as 'affect' to the status of ultimate truths. More specifically, this line of universal thought does not leave any room for cultural variations by ignoring insights into the cultural influences on sensory registers gained by the anthropology of the senses (Edwards et al. 2006 , Morphy 2010 . In other words, the body is always embodied in culture, biography and history, and vice versa. This seemingly tautological argument is deliberately employed to emphasise the mutual dependence and impossibility of separation. By arguing for feelings as interpretations, I am able to draw together the two lines of thought informing this paper, as I subsequently elaborate in theoretical, methodological and empirical terms.
Theoretical framework: feelings as interpretations Nothing has been more harmful in the history of western thought, an essentialised and reductionist demarcation I only reluctantly use to make this overarching point, than the philosophical and scientific separation of 'body' and 'mind', the illusion that we could break a leg without suffering mental repercussions or that we could think without feeling the thought. This fundamental ontological division has led to the all dominating dichotomies of cognition/emotion, thought/feeling, fact/value, knowledge/imagination and consequently to a 'cultural ontology of dualism' which is absent from many Asian intellectual traditions (Liu et al. 2008) . This particular way of thinking is so entrenched that our languages do not seem to provide the means to transcend such a dualistic trap. Dewey opted for 'the body-mind' as a linguistic attempt to stress that 'body' and 'mind' are inseparable ontological dimensions of an interactive process (Johnson 2007) , which highlights the difficulties in overcoming dichotomies without employing another dichotomous vocabulary.
Ground breaking insights into the embodied origin of our interactions with the world have, however, challenged the above notion culminating in such work as Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Damasio 1994) . Interweaving empirical findings from neuroscience with philosophical pondering, Damasio (1994, p. xii) set out to show that 'feeling was an integral component of the machinery of reason' and that 'emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason at all: they may be enmeshed in its networks'. The Cartesian dualism, this almost naive idea of mentally transcending the human flesh, is exposed as an alienated philosophical myth and 'error'.
In a similar vein, Johnson (2007) equally builds on the qualitative dimensions of perception and thought by drawing on both phenomenological and neuroscientific insights. He refers to Gendlin's 'felt sense' of all intellectual engagements, 'this vast lost continent of feeling that underlies all our meaning, thought and symbolic expression' (Johnson 2007, pp. 79-80) . Johnson illustrates this 'felt sense' with the writing process, to which I can naturally relate, being myself in the process of writing this article. No linguistic structure or logic could thereby ever imprint a detached and purely rational argumentative flow. Going through the research material and trying to make sense of a sea of information, an employed argument feels properly contextualised, a section structure feels appropriate and the reader's focus feels achieved. There is a constant flow of 'feeling-thinking', another linguistic attempt to overcome the dichotomous chasms, a 'felt sense of thinking' (Johnson 2007) .
My argument for feelings as interpretations receives theoretical support through a better understanding of how emotions and feelings work. According to Damasio (2000) , emotions are unconscious and outward directed responses to the environment while feelings are inward directed reflections requiring consciousness. Remarkably, even unconscious emotions have an evaluative and embodied interpretive dimension. Damasio (2003, p. 54) argues that 'Emotions provide a natural means for the brain and mind to evaluate the environment within and around the organism, and respond accordingly and adaptively'. Consequently, these 'immanent' or 'embodied meanings' (Johnson 2007) feed directly into our conscious interpretations. To put it succinctly, feelings have an inherently hermeneutic quality linking the conditions and processes of meaning-making in an embodied way, as we witness in the interpretive sections. First, I need to translate the theoretical argument into a methodological framework.
Methodological framework: embodied hermeneutics Since I consider feelings as interpretations embedded in narrative contexts such as culture, biography and history, I need to employ hermeneutics as a methodological tool because it places the individual experience within a sociocultural context and in the process illuminates the hermeneutic circle connecting the whole and its parts (Dilthey 1976) . 'The individual person in his[sic] independent existence is', as Dilthey (1976, p. 181) argues, 'a historical being' entangled in a 'whole web of relationships'. The interpretive dissection of this complex cultural world contrasts 'hermeneutics' with 'phenomenology' since 'the subject of which it speaks is always open to the efficacy of history' (Ricoeur 1981, p. 111) . Ricoeur (1981, p. 123 ) allows an integrated synthesis by emphasising that 'perception "represents" because it is already the seat of a work of interpretation', thus complicating the logic of binary opposition between either representation or non-representation. Consequently, 'phenomenology' immediately 'encounters the concept of interpretation' and 'can be realised only as hermeneutics' (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 123, 128) . Ricoeur (1981, p. 118, 115) , however, stresses equally the 'phenomenological presupposition of hermeneutics' by 'subordinating Sprachlichkeit', the claim of 'the lingual condition … of all experience' and its 'expressibility in principle', to the 'pre-linguistic … structure of experience'. Ricoeur's (1981) emphasis on the phenomenological dimension of hermeneutics is a crucial point but it is still linguistically dominated since the proclaimed 'subordinating' implies that experience 'comes to language' in its search for meaning. While I equally argue for hermeneutics, due to its historical contextualisation of the subjects under scrutiny, I fundamentally disagree with such 'linguistic absolutism' and the exhaustive reduction of meaning to language. This paper hermeneutically demonstrates this assertion to be an impoverishing view of the human experience. Although I interrogate experiences as interpretations via a narrative analysis, this does not amount to a claim that we would ever be able to verbalise all meanings. Many meanings will be interpreted but remain feelings or 'embodied meanings'. Dewey (1934, p. 74 ) lends weight to my position by stating that: 'If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of painting and music would not exist'. Supporting such a vein of thought, Johnson (2007) refers to our innate 'body-based intersubjectivity' as the 'birthplace of meaning' as well as to the philosophical problem of 'qualia', felt qualities which cannot be reduced to conceptual structures such as words. Bruner (1990) , while stressing the key function of language as a cultural tool to fully realise the world, equally reserves space for some prelinguistic 'readiness for meaning'.
By employing a narrative approach, access is only obtained to mediated and reflective feelings rather than subconscious emotions. Given the inherently evaluative nature of such feelings, which I lay bare both theoretically and empirically, I am able to grasp hermeneutically their meaning even when they lack elaborated verbalisation. As reiterated throughout this study, some meanings remain feelings without further linguistic expression. In Davidson's (2006) study of mountaineers, for example, it was simply a 'mountain feeling'. What is required is an embodied hermeneutics with a sensitivity beyond the spoken word without, however, committing phenomenological de-contextualisation. Language, although being inherently selective and reductive of the Gestalt experience, is our 'great vehicle for the growth of meaning' (Johnson 2007, pp. 266-267) . It is this 'growth of meaning' or interpretation as a 'development of understanding' (Ricoeur 1981 ) that we witness in this article.
Research design and analysis I argue for an exploration of narrative 'actions', 'meaning' and 'Self' through a hermeneutic analysis elsewhere (Schorch forthcoming). Here, I offer some details of the research design and analysis to give the reader a sense of the practical execution. Although clearly being situated within museum studies, I feel that the research underpinning this paper is more closely related to ethnographic perspectives investigating the site 'museum' from other academic fields especially anthropology (Gable 2006 , Bruner 2007 , Gable and Handler 2007 .
The biographical narrative approach enabled me to translate the theoretical argument and methodological strategy into an empirical research design. The primary method chosen to follow the empirical approach was semi-structured and in-depth narrative interviews with a group of global visitors to Te Papa (12 interviewees; four each from Australia, Canada and the USA). The main advantage of this method for this study is that it avoids having the findings, or knowledge claims, 'artificialised' (Bruner 1990 ) by the researcher's 'system of relevancy' (Wengraf 2001) . The researcher gets access to the subconscious level of a lived experience without pre-structuring or guiding the flow of the interview. Wengraf (2001, p. 115 precisely by what it assumes and therefore does not focus upon, narrative conveys tacit and unconscious assumptions and norms of the individual or of a cultural group. At least in some respect, they are less subject to the individual's conscious control.
Wengraf (2001) proposes a three-stage analytical structure of biographical narrative interviews which was applied in this research. Each narrative interview was only broadly framed and successively prompted to harmonise the narrative description with the research question, in this case the cross-cultural meanings among global visitors to Te Papa. Ideally, the final stage is conducted as a separate interview at a later date after analysing the first two stages. Wengraf (2001) , however, highlights that any research design is a compromise, and for pragmatic reasons I preferred to conduct one interview while maintaining the three analytical stages. The fact that I conducted follow-up interviews via phone with the interviewees after six months in their respective home environment should outweigh this methodological limitation and was crucial for understanding the context-dependent 'endemic fluidity of meaning' (Bauman 1978) . It enabled me to closely investigate the dynamic relationship between meaning and memory, which, according to Silverman (1995, p. 162) , 'may be viewed as the core mechanism of meaning-making'.
Pamphilon's (1999) 'zoom model' represented an appropriate technique for narrative analysis within this methodological framework and situated the individual within wider sociocultural, political and historical contexts. Pamphilon's model revealed the multiple layers of meaning by focusing on the different levels of narratives: macro-zoom on the sociocultural dimension, meso-zoom on the process of the individual story, micro-zoom on the oral dimensions of the story and interactional zoom on the interviewer-interviewee relationship. In practice, this meant that I debriefed myself after each interview to capture the first impressions and kept a research journal for general ideas during the entire study. The 'word by word' transcription enabled me to become closely familiar with both the research participants and their narrations. In fact, I still feel I am able to attach all quotations, or each story, to the respective person, or face. This, of course, enriched the analytical stage since transcription itself becomes a form of interpretation (Riessman 2008) . I read through the fully transcribed interviews after these were reviewed by the interviewees. While carefully studying the interviews and with my research questions in mind, I marked relevant sections of the respondents' narratives with different colours corresponding to the different zooms. I analysed all initial interviews and afterwards repeated the same procedure with all follow-up interviews. I finalised the analytical stage by comparing each informant's initial and follow-up interview with my debriefing notes to get a sense of interpretive continuities, emergences and renegotiations. During this sometimes tedious but mostly adventurous process, hermeneutic themes and concepts emerged.
In the text of this article, I left the integrity of the quotations as untouched as possible without editing the content or form of the informants' narrations. The sections in italics reflect my emphasis and represent the rising themes and concepts supporting my own interpretation. All names are pseudonyms to guarantee the anonymity of the informant and comply with social science research ethics.
The goal of the research underpinning this paper was the investigation of cross-cultural meanings. It is important to note that this particular article was exclusively driven by the empirical dissection without prior theorising and research focus on feelings. I adhered to the interview format allowing each informant's 'system of relevancy' to reveal itself through the narration and associated meaning-making. The emerging empirical insights into the multisensory, emotive and embodied nature of the museum experience have led to extensive theorising on my part since it allowed me to enrich my understanding of cross-cultural encounters, translation and dialogue (Schorch 2010 ). Clearly it is not possible to fully reflect the argument of a comprehensive research project within the confines of a single journal article, but I offer a glimpse into the hermeneutic complexity of that 'most ineffable of cultural phenomenon -experience' (Healy and Witcomb 2006, p. 1.4) .
The conditions of meaning-making: senses, feelings and embodiment I turn now to the interviewees' stories and my examination of the research material that expose senses, feelings and embodiment as conditions of meaning-making, or hermeneutic foundations, that facilitate the subsequent interpretive processes of meaning-making (Schorch forthcoming). A good starting point is Claudia from Canada, who allows us to delve into the emotive world by reflecting on 'the feeling of being enveloped by a space' (Gregory and Witcomb 2007, p. 5) , and it would simply feel wrong to interrupt her story:
So when I walked into an exhibit, like the 'Blood Earth Fire', if that's what it's called?! When you first walk in and the red lava spewing and you can hear the sounds of things erupting, it just really (paused) makes me more aware of what they are trying to get me to understand. The one with the earthquake simulation, it just really adds to the experience. It's one thing to watch videos or to read about something or, you know, see the lava rocks that may have been the result after the thing, but to be given the chance to try to comprehend what it really sounded like, felt like, smelled like for me as a person, I don't know if everyone would feel the same way, (paused) but once you are trying to experience it first hand, and even though it's a simulation, it may be the closest thing an individual may get to experiencing it. I hope I never have to experience an earthquake. I am in New Zealand so it's quite possible I will (both laughing), but if I was only travelling to New Zealand for a couple of weeks it's very possible that I wouldn't experience one. So being in that and coming from Canada, the east side there is no earthquakes there either, so it gives me an opportunity to, you know, get a sense of what it may be like. And just it broadens my understanding of what occurs when there is an earthquake for example and what people might go through and how the people would feel. So maybe at home when I go back like watching the news and I hear about an earthquake I won't just discount it. I will actually be able to appreciate that piece of news because it's something that I've now more information, more internal understanding of.
Although Claudia does not 'know if everyone would feel the same way', I am convinced that any 'person' can somehow relate to her story and reflected experience: we can never help but feel! Any interpretation depends on, and is bound to, context (Bauman 1978 , Ricoeur 1981 ). Claudia's narration exemplifies that an interpretive context can be achieved through multisensory and embodied performances, a sensory and emotive contextualisation leading to an 'internal understanding' and empathy.
On the one hand, this 'internal understanding' or embodied interpretation could never be exhausted by linguistic expressions transcending its bodily anchoring. At least to a certain extent, it will always remain a felt rather than a spoken experience, meaning and understanding. On the other hand, no one could ever copy Claudia's 'internal understanding', for it arises out of a bodily interaction with an environment, an individual experience of a particular 'situation' (Jackson 1998) with a specific 'pervasive quality' (Johnson 2007) . Dewey (1934, p. 67 ) lends further weight to such experiential terminology, arguing that 'there is no such thing as the emotion of fear, hate, love. The unique, unduplicated character of experienced events and situations impregnates the emotion that is evoked'. It follows that emotions and feelings perform as a 'cementing force' unifying the experience's whole or Gestalt (Dewey 1934) . 'Experience', Dewey (1934, p. 42 ) continues, 'is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it'. This statement might first appear puzzling to the dichotomously conditioned mind, but it just highlights the fact that 'emotion belongs of a certainty to the self' (Dewey 1934, p. 42) . Emotions and feelings are not separated stages but continuous dimensions of any experience. This is the inescapable interpretive condition that, in Denzin's (1989, p. 102) words, 'no experience has the same meaning for two people … because meaning is emotional and biographical'.
Here, Michelle from the USA, narrates her experience of the same earthquake house:
We walked into the little house and then there was an earthquake and it reminded me a little bit about when I lived in Los Angeles. Well, I think I was probably a teenager and we had an earthquake and I woke up with my bed just shaking and shaking. I couldn't figure out what was happening. And then I finally realised 'oh it's an earthquake'. It wasn't a terrible earthquake where people were, you know, losing their homes, but things fell off the shelf and dishes could have been broken … But just experiencing an earthquake in the museum, I am sure a lot of people had never experienced what that would be like.
The significance of prior understandings (Ricoeur 1981) and prior experiences (Dewey 1934) for any experience becomes obvious in Michelle's story. In this context, the narration provides another example of a multisensory and emotive contextualisation as condition of meaning-making. This leads to an embodied 'interactivity' as 'self-inscription' (Witcomb 2003) in a way that goes beyond 'narrative'. The latter could never fully capture or contextualise the human experience of an earthquake since it can only objectify the visceral dimension. Experiencing an earthquake lacks 'expressibility', the alleged 'lingual condition … of all experience' (Ricoeur 1981, p. 115) , and will remain a feeling or 'internal understanding'. Michelle's articulation also proves that any conscious experience and thought process has an imaginative quality (Jackson 1998) . In other words, 'experiencing an earthquake' can never be disassociated from feeling, rationalising and imagining an earthquake.
Susan, also from the USA, refers below to the same exhibit and provides further empirical evidence of these assertions:
And I also found interesting that New Zealand was at such a big risk for earthquakes, I found that interesting. I wasn't home, but at home this past summer there was a 5.2 on the Richter scale in Chicago and they felt it in St. Louis and Indianapolis, which is kind of big because like St. Louis is more than 400 miles away from Chicago, Indianapolis is 300 miles from Chicago. It's kind of a big deal. Standing in the house like feeling it shake, I was like 'oh, so this is what my mom was talking about, this is kind of interesting' … when you walk into the house and you get to feel an actual house shaking, most people have never lived through an earthquake.
Susan's experience arises out of a multisensory, emotive and embodied 'object-subject interaction' (Dudley 2009 ), a process of active and mutual engagement between Self and the physical world. 'Standing in the house like feeling it shake' provokes a deeper understanding of 'what', according to Susan, 'my mom was talking about'. This emphasises the active character of 'perception'. Dewey (1934, p. 54) stresses that perceptions are not passive and isolated receptions but transactionally constituted actions because 'for to perceive', he puts it, 'a beholder must create his own experience'. Damasio (1994, p. 225) offers neuroscientific support for this philosophical claim: 'Perceiving is as much about acting on the environment as it is about receiving signals from it.' Once again, the supposedly rigid border between non-representation and representation is blurred.
In continuing her story, Susan's reflections assume a theoretical quality reminiscent of what Treinen (1996) calls 'theoriegeleitete Wahrnehmung' (theory-driven perception). Theories are constitutive of perceptive actions, which are always already interpreted as I argue throughout. Susan goes on to note:
The whole museum is set up to almost be like a children's museum for adults … like you can take off your shoes and actually walk into the building and experience and touch that and feel that and look at that. And there is something different when you can actually feel the carvings instead of just looking at it. There is (paused), we have all of our senses for a reason and so being able to feel that and actually experience it is a little different. And I think that's one of the reasons why I really enjoyed it … 'We have all of our senses for a reason', Susan exclaims, and 'being able to … experience and touch that and feel that and look at that' makes the museum experience 'a little different'. In fact, the multisensory access to exhibitions and objects beyond the common 'ocularcentric' (Dudley 2009 ) dominance in the 'museum's empire of sight' (Classen and Howes 2006, p. 200) appears to Susan 'almost … like a children's museum for adults'. This conclusion applauds Te Papa's 'set up', but equally highlights the artificial sensory alienation from childhood to adulthood in traditional approaches to education, learning and human development. 'Pervasive qualities' of any experience, however, are 'at once visual, auditory, tactile, social and cultural' (Johnson 2007, p. 72) . Susan attests both empirically and theoretically to this 'relational character of perception' (Jackson 1998) and proceeds with the narrative reflection on her multisensory museum journey:
Well, I mean you can always look at the carvings and you can see the intricate detail, but not until you actually feel the wood or the stone, because your eyes can only see so much detail depending on how good your vision is, but your finger tips are extremely sensitive and you can feel the detail even more than just viewing it. And you just take on a more a better appreciation, you realise 'that's right, this is wood, that's extremely difficult to do, this is stone, this takes so much time, so much back ache and can you imagine having to bend down and look at it like this?!' And just it's a different appreciation like something you don't normally think about in everyday life … I don't know it's just a very, it's awe, I was very awestruck, it was beautiful.
Susan's multisensory, emotive and embodied engagement flows into the interpretive construction of meanings integrating the conditions and processes of meaningmaking in a circular hermeneutic trajectory. The 'corporal encounter' creates a 'medium of intimacy', as Classen and Howes (2006, p. 200, 202) argue, which enables Susan's hand to encounter 'the traces of the hand of the object's creator' and thus connect to both 'sensory as well as social biographies' of a carved object or material reality. Jackson (1998, p. 57 ) sums up my preceding theoretical line of thought by stating that 'to perceive an object is not simply to see, hear, smell or touch it', as 'the psychological fallacy' would have us believe, 'it is to make sense of what one senses, to partake of its meaning'. In Susan's case, 'to partake of its meaning' leads to a 'better appreciation' beyond 'everyday life', which leaves her 'very awestruck'. Senses and feelings merge in the process of meaning-making causing an embodied or 'internal understanding' far beyond linguistic 'expressibility'.
The processes of meaning-making: cultural feelings If the interpretive human condition could never be completely grasped by words, then neither do our innate sensory and emotive engagements pose a threat to some 'higher' form of knowledge and 'truth' in a museum context, as Williams (2003) claims. Dewey (1934, p. 118) reminds us that, instead, 'sense qualities are the carriers of meanings'. Dewey continues to alert us to the 'qualitative determinations', the 'felt sense' (Johnson 2007) , of any thought, knowledge or 'truth' itself and exposes such dichotomising accusation as naivety: 'We cannot grasp any idea, any organ of mediation, we cannot possess it in its full force, until we have felt and sensed it, as much so as if it were an odour or color' (Dewey 1934, p. 119) . It is again Susan who provides more empirical insights on this point:
And then looking at the canoe and seeing how small of a canoe that is, how wide it is and trying to imagine a six-foot man sitting in that cross-legged or even hunched down, being able to feel that and like 'that's crazy'. You know, I wouldn't be able to experience that if it was set up behind glass and like looking at it. I wouldn't actually be able to tell the depth I feel. And that not just me personally, but you just, you can almost feel yourself stepping into the canoe when it's set up in the middle of the floor like that and when you are able to walk into the building … We can again discern that senses, feelings, imagination, thought and understanding are not separate or diametrically opposed entities, but mutually dependent, interrelated and overlapping dimensions of the conditions and processes of meaningmaking. Remarkably, even this narrative reflection and retrospective mediation of the actual experience reveal these dynamics of the Gestalt, the unified whole. Given the limits of this study and the general impossibility of gaining direct access to a 'pure' experience, we can only speculate about the intermeshed richness of Susan's actually experienced 'situation' and its 'pervasive' or 'individualising quality' (Jackson 1998) . Susan carries on to 'to tell the depth I feel':
I have always loved jade … And being able to see the big stone sitting in the, is it the 'Blood Earth Fire' display?! … Just being able to touch that, again it's touching it and feeling it and seeing exactly how smooth it is and just being able to really look at the detail instead of it sitting in the glass behind a case. And hop, there it is, you know, you can't really touch it and like oh that's great. And my brain kind of it gets fried eventually. You know you are walking around looking at the displays and you are reading over it and you start just skimming through and picking up keywords and you halfway understand it, but if you can like feel it and you are interested in it a little more you gonna understand it a little better … It becomes clear that to 'feel' invites us to be 'interested' and enables us to 'understand'. It follows that feelings possess an immanently hermeneutic quality. Susan's follow-up interview offers evidence of the long-term impact of the multidimensional interplay between senses, feelings and embodiment. 'Experience and memory are', according to Chakrabarty (2002) , 'embodied knowledge'. Embodiment performs simultaneously as condition and process of meaning-making. It lives on in memory, in Susan's case as a 'felt presence':
The displays and exhibits that I really remember were the Māori displays and the, I don't remember what it was called, not like a temple but a meeting room where they perform their meetings?! And you were able to take off your shoes and enter in and just kind of sit there and soak it all in. You feel the presence and everything and like all the beautiful carvings and it's nice being able to touch everything and just look at the different, the very beautiful intricate details on the carvings.
For Susan, a 'felt presence' seems to imprint on her memory more profoundly than factual information such as the name of the 'Māori displays'. While cultural critiques may delight in detecting new ammunition for their accusations of sensory and emotive 'trivialisation', I find that conversely this presents further evidence for the inescapably embodied anchoring of meanings. The challenge in life as in museums lies in maintaining and nurturing a healthy balance of all dimensions of the conditions of meaning-making.
By following the follow-up interview with Mike from Australia six months after his visit to Te Papa, we can detect another example of a felt presence or 'eerie sense' embodied in memory:
I don't necessarily remember every gallery but I do remember the delivery of some of the items. The house was very impressive, the Māori house that's being reconstructed within the museum or the two of them there. But the big one I felt gave a real, I mean has an eerie sense when you are inside it. It had a really eerie presence when you walked down the stairs and into it. And sitting there and you can sort of imagine the meetings that were going on there … so often you see these particular either constructions or reconstructions in museums and you are not allowed to actually go in and actually be inside them, but look from behind the rail. But I think that in this particular case it really works that you go inside and the light is sort of dimmed to the stage of where it would be normally in the evening perhaps. So I thought that it sets the scene of what it is rather than if you just sat behind a barrier and looked at it, which is sort of too often done. I guess they are precious items so you gotta trust the public that they don't get out their pocket knife and carve their name in the side of it. If you don't have access to the item, then you don't make a link and you don't think with it. That was memorable.
Reminiscent of the interplay between space, form and medium and the associated museological media 'landscape' (Schorch forthcoming). Mike stresses that 'I don't necessarily remember every gallery but I do remember the delivery of some of the items'. Mike's expressions reveal the productive and creative role of sensory and emotive evocation in museological interpretation towards the dialogical creation of meanings. 'If you don't have access to the item', he asserts, 'then you don't make a link and you don't think with it'. This is what, according to Mike, makes a museum experience 'memorable', to get 'in touch … with other peoples and worlds through their material effects' (Classen and Howes 2006, p. 217) . His view echoes the museum literature (Kaplan 1995, Hutchison and Collins 2009 ) with scholars highlighting dimensions such as 'resonance and wonder' (Greenblatt 1991) , imagination (Bedford 2004 ) and empathy (Gregory and Witcomb 2007) . In the context of this article, the empirical evidence demonstrates anew that the conditions and processes of meaning-making are tightly interwoven with the construction of memories.
Conclusion
The emotive dimension carried through the interviewees' narrative journeys and remained at the heart of the human condition: from the experience of a museum space to the engagement between 'Self' and 'Other'. Here, the conditions flowed into the processes of meaning-making during cross-cultural encounters. The longterm research drawn on in this article has offered empirical insights into the ongoing negotiation of embodied experience, memory and knowledge. Feelings entered into the realm of culture and the empirical findings highlighted the ubiquitous presence of cultural feelings that are largely ignored in conventional approaches to museum visitor studies. On the one hand, the normative, which is undoubtedly an inherent dimension of any cultural meaning, is awarded the status of absolute dominance by an 'invisible actor behind the scenes' (Arendt 1958) in the form of a monolithic state in most understandings of museums. At the same time, these anaemic perspectives degrade living beings to lifeless shadows. In short, the 'complex prism which is culture' (Featherstone 1990 ) is naively reduced and reified producing significant shortcomings in our understanding of heritage as an experience.
By arguing for feelings as interpretations in theoretical, methodological and empirical terms, I have shaped an integrated synthesis of both representational and non-representational dimensions. If the human experience, the 'most ineffable of cultural phenomenon' (Healy and Witcomb 2006, p. 1.4) , is the point of departure, then either/or approaches will not do the trick. Such dualisms are specific products of the intellectual, or abstract, world and should not be simply imposed on empirical realities thus foreclosing any nuanced understanding. The objects of the material world themselves 'have sensory as well as social biographies' (Classen and Howes 2006, p. 200) . To put it differently, nothing is ever only material but embedded in the complex grammar and ecology of embodied culture and cultural embodiment.
Senses, feelings and embodiment interact with narrative in the quest for meaning. These dimensions and traces are inextricably entangled within the human experience: without one another, they wither and die. In order to maintain such a holistic awareness, I think it requires a shift from an oscillating to a circular dialectic that tracks the hermeneutic relations between the whole and its parts, and vice versa. I have pursued this with an embodied hermeneutics and my 'distinction' between the conditions and processes of meaning-making through an understanding of interpretive actions, movements and performances made by cultural actors should offer a useful basis for more ethnographic research dissecting the 'moments' and 'processes' of heritage. Our knowledge of the physicality of the museum experience (Dudley) and of 'what exactly people do … with the concept of heritage itself' (Smith 2006b, p. 45 ) is still very limited, which emphasises the need to carry the phenomenon of heritage from the world of abstract reasoning into the realm of lived experience.
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